The Dynamics of Insurgency

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> *Inherent in all societies in transition are sociological, political and eco-*
> *nomic dysfunctions that can cause frustrations among certain sectors of the*
> *populace. If allowed to build up, these frustrations may be transformed into*
> *grievances. Whether these grievances will create an insurgent situation*
> *depends on the interaction of accelerators and retardants present in society.*
> *Equipped with a vibrant leadership, ideology and cadre system, an insurgent*
> *situation may grow into a self-sustaining revolutionary movement with poten-*
> *tially increasing strength.*

Introduction

Each nation is born with seeds of its own destruction. The growth of
the seed depends upon the ability of the government to perform its two
basic functions of dispensing justice and managing violence. When the gov-
ernment becomes unresponsive to the ends for which it was established, then
the people alter or change it legally or extra legally.

Basically, overthrowing authority by illegal means assumes three forms
depending upon the sequence by which the power bases of the country,
namely, the government, military and people are attacked and/or controlled.[1]
In a coup d'etat, the government, mainly the chief executive, is deposed
and the conspirators take control of the government. Then the military is
compelled to obey and ultimately the people are controlled. In another
instance, a minority position group would ask the support and intervention
of a foreign country. If this plea for help is answered, the military is
first engaged and defeated, then the government is taken over and the people

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are ultimately controlled. The third form targets the population first and then from within the populace, guerrilla forces are organized and a shadow government is established. The security forces of the regime are then targetted and defeated. The government collapses as a matter of course. In some historical cases as in Cuba, Cyprus, and Timor, there was not even a need for a confrontation with the security force before the collapse of the civil government. This model is called insurgency.

Insurgency as a word was invented circa 1961. Prior to that time, the prevalent idea was that there are three echelons of conflict in a war situation: (1) a general war which is the most intense; (2) a limited war which is lower in scale; and (3) a sub-limited war, variously called twilight war, unconventional war, shadow war, anti-subversive war, lieutenant's war, anti-banditry war, etc., which is ill-defined.

It was only in 1961 that serious attempts were made to define insurgency. Prime architects in this effort were Roger Hilsman, Walter Rostow and General Maxwell Taylor.[2] The United States perceived insurgency as the result of the machination of foreign agents acting within the framework of the East-West confrontation. This view was revised in the late '60s when insurgency came to be perceived as a result of the influence of communist doctrines. Again in the middle '70s, insurgency was given another interpretation, this time as the ill-effects of development.

In this article, insurgency is defined as an illegal movement which seeks to mobilize mass support for politico-military actions to overthrow the government[3] or alter state policies, rulers or institutions through violent means where violent competition is not the norm and where well-defined institutions exist.[4] This article describes and analyzes the dynamics of insurgency.

The Dynamics of Insurgency

Almost every country in transition has sociological, political, economic and other vulnerabilities which lend themselves to the development of multiple dysfunctions in the society if nothing is done about them. These multiple dysfunctions may frustrate popular aspirations and grievances may develop to move the society towards its limits of tolerance. The rate society moves towards this limit is dependent upon the ratio between the existing accelerators and retardants. The path society will take after it reaches the limit of tolerance depends upon whether the movement acquires the Primary Power and Secondary Power Factors to develop the revolutionary processes.

Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the evolution of an insurgency.

Figure 1. Anatomy of Insurgency

POLITICAL
SYSTEM

LIMIT OF TOLERANCE

"PRECIPITANTS"

INSURRECTION

MULTIPLE → FRUSTRATION → GRIEVANCES

DYSFUNCTIONS

SOCIAL
SYSTEM

ACCELERATORS →

← RETARDANTS

INSURGENCY

LEADER

IDEOLOGY

CADRE

POPULAR SUPPORT

FOREIGN SUPPORT

SANCTUARY

INTELLIGENCE

OTHERS

The Seeds of Discontent

There is an abundance of etiological studies on insurgency.. There are studies that trace the seeds of revolution to intellectual causes. Other writers blame economic conditions. Others give political explanations. Still another group of writers identifies aspects of social structure and social forces as the causes of insurgency. Finally, there are theories about great and puny men.

Such explanations may be classified into structural and behavioral models.[5] The structural hypothesis singles out objective social conditions as crucial to the development of internal wars: aspects such as economic conditions, social stratification, or geographic and demographic factors. The behavioral hypothesis, on the other hand, emphasizes attitudes and their formations and orientations such as anomie in the society, the process by which tension and aggression are generated and the process by which men are "socialized" in their communities.

The behavioral causes of internal wars according to Crane Benton are relative deprivation, anomie, alienation of intellectuals, elite estrangement, and loss of elite self-confidence,[6] which come about as a result of the perceptions of the following structural conditions:[7]

a.   *Psycho-Social*

(1) Conflicts in traditional social organizations and customs as a result of contact with other cultures;
(2) Great social mobility;
(3) Little social mobility;
(4) Pressure of a dense and rapidly expanding population in an agrarian society;
(5) Divisive rifts in the population stemming from class, ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences;
(6) Too much recruitment of non-elite members to the elite;
(7) Inadequate recruitment into the elite of the able and powerful non-elite;
(8) Widespread illiteracy and an inadequate educational system;
(9) Indolent national character;
(10) Appearance in the society of a new social class;
(11) A newly awakened nationalism;
(12) Lack of national feeling or sense of national identity; persistence of local or tribal loyalties;
(13) Anticolonialism;
(14) Lack of knowledge and identification on the part of the people with the goals and objectives of the government;
(15) A widespread sense of injustice, lack of means of redressing individual injustices;

(16) Lack of faith in the government and in the social and economic systems;

(17) Lack of a dynamic ideology;

(18) Low national morale;

(19) Poorly motivated civil and military establishments;

(20) A crisis in personal and national identity, a sense of loss;

(21) Diffused uncertainty and anxiety concerning personal and national future, causing alternately aggressive and apathetic behavior.

b. *Political*

(1) Present or recent domination by a colonial power, inexperience or new indigenous leaders and administrators, inadequate civil service system;

(2) A government unresponsive to the aspirations of the people;

(3) Tyrannical, repressive, corrupt or inefficient leadership;

(4) Lack of communication between the government and the people;

(5) Lack of control by the government over rural areas and consequent breakdown of law and order;

(6) Unstable government;

(7) Frustrated articulate segments of the intelligentsia which advocate radical solutions to speed modernization;

(8) A small but growing middle class, and extremes of right and left which oppose the struggle of the middle class for political and economic influence;

(9) The immaturity of the political process which does not permit the diffusion of power in the form of multiple interest groups and political parties;

(10) The unwillingness of the leading elite to tolerate responsible opposition groups;

(11) Estrangement of the military forces from the people;

(12) Failure to provide effective military and police forces;

(13) Military elements that are unresponsive to higher authority;

(14) Factionalism within the military forces;

(15) Absence of truly national loyalties in military establishment;

(16) Lack of awareness of popular aspirations and attitudes.

c. *Economic*

(1) Widespread poverty;

(2) Grossly inequitable distribution of wealth and income, concentration of wealth and economic power in one class or in a few individuals or families;

(3) Agricultural backwardness characterized by low capitalization, low level of agrarian techniques; poor transportation, incapability of weathering minor crises, land hunger and one-crop economies;

(4) A highly inequitable and inefficient system of land tenure tending to produce either vast landholdings of fragmented small holdings combined with the lack of capital leading to usurious interest rates, chronic indebtedness and a penurious rural populace;

(5) A backward, unbalanced industry characterized by a small and inefficient indigenous sector specializing in light industry and a modern sector more often than not owned by a foreign interest;

(6) Inept, naive, ultranationalistic leaders who are incapable of developing a viable economy;

(7) A system of taxation and tax collection which is inequitable and which provides insufficient revenue for necessary government functions;

(8) Dependence on foreign capital assistance, and at the same time opposition to foreign private investment;

(9) Overdependence on export of raw materials or a single commodity;

(10) Large-scale unemployment, including an impatient segment of educated unemployment;

(11) An unstable currency;

(12) Lack of, or underdeveloped, natural resources;

(13) Inadequate transportation and communication systems.

The Sense of Relative Deprivation

James C. Davis contends that after a period of increasing economic gains and political privileges a society will come to expect further increases in the future. Actually the gain is less than what is hoped for, but the gap between expectations and realization is tolerable. If or when this is followed by a short term phase of stagnation or decline, the gap becomes intolerable and the people may perceive the government to be at fault. Davis calls this the "J-curve phenomenon"[8] or the theory of rising expectation, lagging realization. This theory shows that insurgents are neither the destitute nor the satisfied but those whose actual situation is improving less rapidly than they expect.

Samuel Huntington[9] and Ted Gurr[10] present other models of relative deprivation. One sees people's expectations rising but their capabilities remain the same. Merton advanced the same idea in his reference group theory.[11] He says that human satisfaction is related not to existing condi-

tions but to the conditions of a social group against which the individual measures his situation. Mass communications are creating appetites that do not formerly exist. If they cannot be satisfied through society's norms and institutions, political violence may result. Another model of relative deprivation is when a society comes upon hard times: expectations remain unchanged, but capabilities decline. Those who are reluctant to tighten their belts may offer "violent" solutions.

The gap between expectations and realization becomes the government's legitimacy gap. Insurgency has been described by Adlai Stevenson as a "revolution of rising expectations/rising frustrations." A revolution may be caused by the widening gap between expectations—social and political for the new rich, economic for the poor—and realities of everyday life.

Anomie

Emile Durkheim coined the word "anomie" to refer to political disorientation. Anomie may result from excessive social mobility. Rapid mobility, both horizontal and vertical, and particularly urbanization, produce a sense of rootlessness and anxiety. In a highly stratified society, the newly risen elements may find themselves under stress. If they are not accepted by the people in this stratum, they become over conscious of their social inferiority and may dream of destroying the whole social order. Rapid development also produces new poor workers whose wages cannot cope with inflation or unemployment in a society where the old cushions of an extended family and village have gone and in which a new cushion of social security has not yet been created. Political disorientation may be followed by the formation of a new set of orientation, establishing predisposition towards violence.

Alienation of the Intellectuals

Alienation is another term for disaffection. Alienation may develop in groups predisposed toward a distinctive viewpoint in a society. Organized into institutionalized groupings such as universities, factories, church or even military establishments, scholars, writers, clergymen, and scientists, form "islands of separateness."[1,2] The intellectuals as a group are usually the first to be alienated. It has been said that the transfer of allegiance of society's intellectuals is the "master symptom" of revolution: a condition that makes revolutionary momentum irreversible.

Elite Estrangement

There are theories that internal wars are caused primarily by changes in elite characteristics. The drastic changes may develop feelings among the people that their rulers live in totally different environment and that they

are separated from their subjects in some profound sense. Westernized elites in developing countries may adopt westernized lifestyles and lead lives totally different from that of their people. In turn, the people may become disoriented or alienated.

Loss of Elite Self-Confidence

A ruling elite may decay, may become torn by severe internal power struggle, may be reluctant to use its power, may lose its vital political skills. In all these cases, it loses faith in itself and rests its hopes in miracles.

Moving Towards The Limit of Tolerance

The lack of harmony between the political system, on the one hand, and the social system on the other may develop frustrations. Brian Crozier wrote "that frustration, the inability to do something one badly wants to do through circumstances beyond his control, is one element common to all rebels, whatever their crimes, social backgrounds or political ideals."[13] Frustrated people are more credulous, want to suffer and sacrifice themselves to a cause, and enjoy being bamboozeled; frustrated people need to hate because when hatred is shared with others, it is the most potent of all unifying emotions.[14] When frustration is allowed to build-up, it becomes a grievance, and as such, an impulse for action.

The speed with which society moves towards its limits of tolerance depends on the presence of "accelerators" or positive forces that propel society to violence and "retardants" or countervailing forces that tend to inhibit or obstruct the development of internal wars.

Accelerators

The accelerators of internal wars are: inefficiency of the elites, disorienting social processes, subversion, and facilities available to the potential insurgents.[15]

Elite inefficiency may result from the breakdown of internal cohesiveness of the elites because of too much recruitment of members of the nonelite to the elite groups, power struggles among cliques, and vagaries of personalities. The elite may also fall short of expected performance due to its personal limitations; it may also be so handicapped by a web of factors that hamper formulation and implementation of appropriate plans and policies. These factors may be found in the conditions of production, income distribution patterns, consumption habits, as well as in the planning and implementing agency frameworks.[16] Elite inefficiency in itself always invites challenges from within or without.

Political disorientation results in the deligitimization of the regime. As mentioned earlier, it comes about as a response to certain conditions.

Subversion attempts deliberately to activate the political disorientation to form new political orientations and to impede the efficiency of the elite.

Facilities to the potential insurgents would include terrain and communications networks. A country's geography may favor the insurgents' communication facilities; it may also facilitate organization and expansional work.

Retardants

Countervailing the above accelerators are adjustive concessions, diversions, repression, facilities for the incumbent, and people.[17]

Adjustive concessions reduce tensions. In contemporary Philippines, the President recalled controversial decrees to diffuse conflict among certain sectors of society. The government, to alleviate the economic condition of the people, asked them to help themselves instead of relying on the government totally. The government will provide financial and technical assistance and the people provide the labor and entrepreneurship. The *Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran* (KKK) is an example.* The suspension of the construction of the Chico River Dam and the creation of autonomous regional governments in the south are other examples of government conciliatory moves.

Diversions channel psychic energies away from revolutionary objectives, provide other outlets for aggression or otherwise absorb emotional tensions. Religion has a way of extending the limit of tolerance of a people by reconciling people with their conditions and making submission to it a sacred obligation. It is a general observation that people turn to religion in times of crisis. Religion provides an outlet for emotional expression. Orgiastic excitements—festivals, dances, parades, sports, etc.—also provide diversionary outlets for popular discontent. These activities would exhaust the people physically, emotionally and financially to carry out revolutions. The Miss Universe Pageant, the Manila International Film Festival which were held in Manila are examples of such activities.

Repression is another retardant; it lessens the chances of violent attack on the government. But for repression to be effective, it must be continuous. Otherwise, it becomes an accelerator.

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*For more of this program of the Philippine government, please see *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXVII, No. 4 (October 1983), pp. 372-411.

Military adventurism is another excellent diversion. Military success can marvelously cement disjoined societies but failures may accelerate revolution. Argentina prior and after the Falkland wars is a case in point.

Facilities are double-edged swords. They are both retardants and accelerators.

People could be a retardant. If the military remains loyal, the elite's cohesion remains intact, and the people have very low propensity to revolt.

Breaching the Limit of Tolerance

The limit of tolerance may be breached by an incident or a series of incidents. The precipitants are always unique and ephemeral in character such as calamity, moral indiscretion at high places, an ill-advised policy. A precipitant is the straw that breaks the camel's back.

The path society follows after the limit of tolerance is breached depends on whether the movement acquires the Primary and Secondary Power Factors to develop the revolutionary processes. If it does not, then an insurrection occurs. If it does, then there is an insurgency or rebellion.

The Insurgent Power Factors

Compton Ward identifies the factors that constitute the bases of insurgent strength. The first or primary power factors are priority requirements, meaning, that the movement cannot exist without them. These are leadership, ideology and cadre. A movement which possesses these mutually supporting elements is self-sustaining and potentially capable of increasing its strength. The secondary power factors are materials, capabilities or instruments of force.[18] These may or may not be present in any given insurgent situation.

1. Leadership

Revolutionary leadership is found, first in the power and in the more ambitious or idealistic sectors of the middle class, then in the poor white collar workers, who, scorned by both the middle class and the elites, are unable to find a common cause with them.

The leadership defines the political objectives of the movement, develops its strategy, generates external support and manages the time and space factors to develop the revolutionary will. Insurgencies may have any of the following ultimate objectives:[19] (1) establish new political values and structure (revolutionary) as exemplified by the CPP/NPA*; (2) leave the existing political community and reconstitute a new one (secessionist) like the

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*Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army

MNLF/BMA**; (3) restore political values and structures of a recent past (restorational) as in the case of the rightists; (4) re-establish political values and structures of an idealized past (restorational) as reflected in the democratic revolution of the government; (5) change the economic and political power distribution (reformist) as in the case of the democratic revolution and reflected at times by the social democrats (Soc Dems); and (6) retain existing political values and structures (conservative).

The insurgent leadership after having defined the objective of the insurgency must develop the strategy to attain the objective. There are five strategies. These are the "Right Strategy", "Left Strategy", "Mass Strategy", "Terrorism" and "Unarmed Political Action." A movement may use a combination of these strategies.

(a) *"Right Strategy"* which is an oft-employed political strategy is characterized by the infiltration of members of an insurgent organization into the society's political and social organizations; manipulation of these institutions to perpetuate unrest; and propaganda, sometimes accompanied by sabotage and terrorism, to discredit the government and influence the populace. This strategy places emphasis on the party gaining control of mass organizations and the use of coalitions. Little emphasis is placed on the development of armed elements.[20]

In its simplest form, this strategy entails the insurgent party's entry into a coalition with other political parties. A prerequisite of the Right Strategy is that the insurgent party appears to function within a legal framework. This strategy avoids blatant overt violence utilized by the Left and Mass Strategies. Organizations publicly identified with the insurgent party normally do not become involved in armed confrontations with forces of the incumbent government. By covertly placing members of the insurgent group in existing organizations and by selectively recruiting key personnel, the insurgents may be able to exercise strong influence within the organizations. By uniting a number of these organizations into coalitions, the insurgent party can wield more political power. Through their political organization, they attempt to gain sufficient electoral support to permit participation in a coalition government with other parties.

Once in a position to challenge the government, the insurgents begin to make impractical demands, agitate against programs of the incumbent government, and may covertly instigate riots, strikes, terror and other violent measures to discredit opposition members in the government. These activities, coupled with effective propaganda, have as their objective, the takeover of power through what appears to be legitimate procedures.

**Moro National Liberation Front/Bangsa Moro Army

(b) *"Left Strategy"* is considered the strategy of the "altruistic true believer" who is convinced that the ultimate revolution against oppression lies in the immediate future. The true believer envisions a spontaneous uprising of the masses against their government sparkled by a suitable catalyst, and a struggle of short duration. Oriented largely towards highly populated urban centers, this strategy is directed by a small core of insurgents with little development of a shadow government or of mass organization.

A corollary is the "foco theory" of the Cuban Revolution. Che Guevarra said that the necessary conditions to a revolutionary situation can be created through the emergence in rural areas of highly trained guerilla fighters organized into a highly cohesive group called the "foco." The "foco" mobilizes the masses against the government and serves as the vanguard and center of the revolution.[21] While it was successful in Cuba, Che Guevarra learned a bitter experience in Bolivia where he was killed. Regis Debray, another theorist of the Cuban Revolution, believed that military priorities must precede politics. The military must struggle to beget the party.[22] After Che Guevarra's Bolivian experience, he modified his theory and opted for urban insurgency and terrorism.

(c) *"Mass Strategy"* envisions a protracted conflict against the incumbent government. Organizationally, the Mass Strategy emphasizes an intricate party structure which utilizes mass civil organizations and armed elements. The insurgent party operates from a secure base and establishes a parallel governmental structure that competes for legitimacy with the existing administrative structure of the incumbent government. Through a cellular organizational structure, and a system of interlocking directorate, attempts are made to control all aspects of the movement. Control mechanisms whereby party dominance is assured take various forms and may achieve a high degree of complexity.

The ultimate goal of the Mass Strategy is the establishment of a government controlled by the insurgent party. A military arm is considered essential for the ultimate success of this type of insurgency. The relative importance of the armed element varies with local conditions, e.g., the government's military strength and the insurgent party's evaluation of circumstances. If total military victory is not attainable, the Mass Strategy entails a continued effort to transfer the people's allegiance to the insurgent political structure while the established government's administrative structure is being rendered ineffective. It should be noted that many of the tactics and techniques of the Mass Strategy can be applied to urban as well as rural insurgencies.[23]

The Mass Strategy is also known as the "four classes" or "war of national liberation" approach. There are three indispensable elements in this strategy: (1) a party of subversives who engage in a revolution on a full-time

basis; (2) the armed element of the movement which is used to speed up the organizational and expansional activities; and (3) the civil structures or fronts into which the populace is organized as the insurgency proceeds.[24]

Mao Tse Tung considered the study of war as the study of society. To him, the people are there but they are immobile, without vitality, unaware of their potential. To wage war successfully, people need only to be politically mobilized so they can recognize their destiny and vocation. Politics is organizing the masses. War is an aspect of this process; politics is bloodless war and war is the politics of bloodshed. The main form of struggle is war and the main instrument is the army which is under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The other forms of organization and struggle led by the Party are coordinated directly or indirectly with the war. The Maoist tradition is military power through political means; with Mao, revolutionary war was born.[25]

The Vietminh revolutionaries contributed to the Asian communist the tradition of political violence but also began the reorientation of tradition away from pure guerilla warfare. Vietminh revolutionary strategy places more immediate value on its international alliance than on its popular infrastructure which is a departure from the Chinese strategy of power both militarily and politically. Dien Bien Phu was the most controversial contribution because it was contrary to Mao's caution against decisive battles on which are staked the destiny of the nation. The Vietminh legacy can thus be stated in these terms: decisive battles shorten protracted war.[26]

The Vietcong synthesis can be stated as: political power through military means. They used political violence and selective terrorism; there was no mass line; it was not self-reliant but initiated from outside the embattled area; they had international recognition of its front organization. The essence of their strategy is not to defeat the US and allied forces but to convince the US that their (US) position is hopeless through the pervasive use of violence at selected points. On the other hand, the Vietcong had tried to create the impression that they were determined to wage a protracted war, if need be, an endless war. The Vietcong strategy is neither revolutionary nor guerilla warfare. It is not revolutionary in the sense that it creates rather than respond to social grievances and it loses its guerilla characteristics to the extent that it no longer depends upon an overtly non-belligerent but covertly engaged population to provide its army with an overwhelming intelligence advantage.[27]

(d) *Terrorism.* The failure of rural insurgency in the 1970's led many revolutionaries to question the viability of a rural-based insurgency despite Mao's and Giap's earlier successes. The shift to urban guerilla warfare and eventually to terrorism resulted not only from the lack of political and

popular support from the countryside or from the efficiency of well-trained counterinsurgency troops but also to other factors. The city, with mass media, modern technology, and vulnerable targets, represents another front of the struggle.

Terrorism is defined as the use of threat or use of anxiety-causing extra-normal violence for political purpose by individuals or groups when such actions are intended to influence attitude and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims.[25] Acts of terrorism are designed to induce fear which later on is transformed into anxiety, then to depair. The final outcome is the target audience's escape or surrender.[29] Terrorism becomes transnational when such actions transcend national boundaries; it is international terrorism when such actions are carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors supported morally or materially by a sovereign state.[30] The terrorist strategy aims not to defeat the forces of the government militarily but to bring about moral alienation of the masses from the government until it is complete, total, and irreversible.[31] It aims to cause the government to act outside the law and to take repressive measures which will in turn alienate the masses, thus setting the stage for a revolution. Terrorism is an arm a revolutionary can never relinquish.[32]

(e) *Unarmed Political Action* is a developing strategy especially in urban centers. This strategy is based on the proposition that all the bases of power of the government depend on the consent, cooperation and compliance of the people.[33] To weaken the government, therefore, is to weaken its power bases. The activities related to unarmed political action include mass demonstrations and rallies, strikes, civil disobedience, boycott, fastings and politicization or conscientization of the people. All these weaken the legitimacy of the government.

The leadership should generate internal and external resources to implement its strategy. The leadership's ideological orientation is very important in getting external support. Internally, the leadership generates the resource process as will be discussed later.

Another important function of the leadership is the development of the revolutionary will. The leadership must be able to move the static grievances into motives for action. To do this, the following steps must be taken:[34] (1) develop awareness or politicize the people. Awareness creates a revolutionary class then a revolutionary base; (2) convince the people that their interests are not best served by the incumbent government; (3) convince the people that the government must be toppled; (4) convince the people that the cause is compelling and must be done now; (5) convince the people there is a chance to win in this political struggle. This will be taken up further in the discussion of the causal and intimidation processes of insurgency.

2. Cadre

The central tenet of any insurgent organizational technique is the formation of a nucleus of disciplined, trained and highly motivated members. They form the core of the organization thus enabling the insurgents to closely control the masses. The function of the cadre is to keep the movement alive while preserving its unique character and identity. It serves as a source of leadership and as a propagandist and interpreter of the ideology.

The cadre initiates the conflict, if possible in rural areas, within striking distance of strategic targets. At the same time, urban insurgency is also developed to give the insurgency a general, national complexion and maximum propaganda effect. The rebellion must be the object of national attention, too shocking in its initial effect to be ignored. The cadres relate each incident and each phase of the conflict to a "great cause" so that revolutionary violence is seen as a natural and moral means to a desired end, and the masses of the people are increasingly involved. The struggle cannot be allowed to seem meaningless and chaotic; it must arouse great expectation and appear at every crucial stage, so that no one can stand outside of it. The cadre is basically a propagandist, an agitator, and a disseminator of the revolutionary idea who uses the struggle itself—the actual physical conflict—as an instrument of agitation. His primary goal is to raise the level of revolutionary anticipation to popular participation, to the crisis point at which the revolution becomes general throughout the country and the masses carry out the final task—the destruction of the existing order and (often but not always) the military that defends it.

3. Ideology

Ideology denotes a system of practical beliefs developed by and characteristic of a group whose members have common political, economic, cultural or religious bond. Practically all ideologies have the following major components:[35] (1) a commitment to a set of fundamental values; (2) a theory of society, (3) a concept of an alternative future; and (4) a program of action. Ideology is the unifying force of the movement. Reflecting on the Philippine Revolution of 1896, Apolinario Mabini concluded that its failure was due to the lack of ideology as well as the absence of an organization to instill revolutionary consciousness and effect coordinated action.[36]

An insurgent is an ideologue, a political partisan, an armed citizen whose primary weapon is not the rifle but his relationship with the people. He is a conscious agent of the revolution; his military role, while vital, is only incidental to his political mission. He is dedicated to a single purpose: the overthrow of the government and the destruction of the existing political, or social or even may be, economic system.

4. Popular Support

Any revolution from below requires a wide base of support in order that it may capitalize upon its unseen ally—time. Insurgency is war for the people's high risk social and political participation.

5. External Support

The climate of world opinion, the position of the insurgent struggle within the framework of ideological conflict, and the physical conditions bearing on outside support mutually interact in a significant manner to determine the extent and type of support that the insurgent movement can command. Vo Nguyen Giap wrote that "in foreign policy, efforts must be made to win the support of progressive people throughout the world."[37]

6. Sanctuary

Sanctuary provides the insurgents with a secure base from which the movement can grow. It can be used as a supply point, training area, rest area, or as a potential site of vital industry. It can be situated either within the country or outside where the insurgent enjoys the support of a neighboring country.

7. Intelligence

The accuracy and timeliness of insurgent intelligence affect strategic and tactical actions.

From the above discussion, the total power potential of an insurgency can thus be gauged in terms of the following:

$$PP = (L.I.C) (1 + 2PS + FS + S + INTEL + \ldots)$$

Where: L = Leadership
          I = Ideology
          C = Cadre
        PS = Popular Support
        FS = Foreign Support
          S = Sanctuary
    INTEL = Intelligence

The Revolutionary Process

What is not seen in the schematic diagram in Figure 1 are the revolutionary processes and their relationships to form a collective dynamics.

These processes are the causal, intimidation, resource, guerilla action, and the collective psychological strategy processes.

The causal process starts as political and social mediation weakens or collapses. The insurgents capture popular motivation and hold it by addressing local values and interest, by demonstrating genuine interest and by pre-empting government action in the area. The insurgents' objective is to fan the fire of revolution, to raise the entire population against the government, to discredit it, to isolate it and destroy its credibility. A revolutionary national culture that belongs to the broad masses of the people is propagated to oppose and repudiate the present "decadent" culture. The insurgents' politicization or conscientization activities transform grievances into national goals that the people have been robbed of and must gain now. The will to revolt as an expression of a newly awakened consciousness produces all at once a pervasive and urgent desire for radical change based on the new insight. It is startling in its simplicity, that the conditions of life that seem unsurmountable can, after all be changed. The static grievances are now transformed into motivation for action. Insurgency is not a matter of manipulation but of inspiration.

The intimidation process is directed basically to organizational growth and unity. It aims to develop geographic areas of predictable, favorable behavior.[38] The insurgents try to sever communication between the government and the people and do not tolerate revisionism from its members. Insurgents induce the civilians to cooperate positively through the causal process and negatively through the subtle introduction of implied or real intimidation into that process. The people are made aware that cooperative conduct with the government can always be punished. In addition, organizational unity is achieved not by allowing competing groups to exist; if they do, however, there should only be one organization to orchestrate the movement. Thomas Grassey identifies four groups that form a dynamics: the revolutionary leader, the active participants, the non-participants, and the counter-revolutionaries.[39] The revolutionary leader and his active participants (the cadre and his infrastructure) selectively target the pro-government supporter to intimidate the non-participants while the counter-revolutionary and his active participants (the brueaucracy) have to target not only the insurgent leadership, the pro-insurgents but also the non-participants to hold their loyalty.

The causal and the intimidation processes become mutually reinforcing in a combined single dynamics that increases social/political participation. To cite Samuel Huntington, the political essence of revolution is the rapid expansion of political consciousness and the mobilization of new groups into politics at a speed which makes it impossible for existing institutions to assimilate them. Revolution is the extreme case of the explosion of political participation.[40] To the insurgent, however, the increased participation of the people is converted into a resource process.

The resource process is an expanding spiral dynamics between the causal process and resources. This dynamics can be described as the cause-resource principle. It links together the cause, the resources generated from increased social participation, the political objective which is served by the act of participation and back to cause which at this time is no longer the original static cause. The internal resource process will require self-reliance and frugal resource practices so as not to become dependent on external resources than is absolutely necessary. Such a policy also reinforces the political objective in developing widespread participation. The insurgent aims to escalate the momentum of the struggle by using war to feed war—getting weapons, supplies, support government forces/workers. The more resources used by the government, the greater resources available to the insurgents. The insurgents will make it too expensive for the government to protect itself. They will try to sabotage the government's economy and frustrate its plans to mobilize its wealth.

External support is as important as internal support. Thus, the insurgents, in order to have an assured influx of support for the duration of the struggle, add the more esoteric dimension of ideology, or a higher level of political interest to the peasants' causal process.

Guerilla action reinforces the causal process and makes up for any weakness of the other processes. The guerilla force of the insurgent is basically designed to wage warfare against the civilian supporters of the government, and to perform highly selective militant action to achieve political and psychological ends. It should be emphasized that guerilla forces by design are not geared for military victory. It will always be inferior to the government forces and as such will resort to a "war of the flea".[4][1] In such an analogy, the insurgents are the fleas and the government is the dog. The dog has too much to defend. The fleas are too small and too agile an enemy to come to grip with. If the conflict continues long enough, the dog may succumb to exhaustion and anemia without finding anything to hold onto.

The insurgents will avoid direct confrontation until such time that they have trained enough men and have acquired arms to defeat the government forces in open battle. It does not mean, however, that the insurgency will be a protracted war. In Cuba, the Batista regime collapsed before the military confrontation had fully developed. Batista and his key civil and military leaders fled the country and those left behind could not lead the government and the military. In Cyprus, political solution obviated the need for a military showdown. The island became too unprofitable and politically embarassing for the British to remain. They went out not because they were forced to but because there was no compelling reason to stay.

The insurgent guerilla force will wear down the government forces and will employ a multitude of suitable means to that end. The insurgents will

sip at the morale of the troops and induce the maximum expenditure of funds and manpower.

When the insurgency/revolutionary resources dynamics is combined with the guerilla action process, the insurgency has reached a collective dynamics which may result in a resource drain and eventual political defeat of the government. A climate of government collapse is thus created.

Insurgency also has three overlapping phases. Insurgent movements often follow a logical pattern of development from a clandestine phase of planning to the final phase of overwhelming the armed force of the incumbent government. Communist-led or inspired insurgency follows Mao Tse-Tung's three stages: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic counter-offensive. The US Army doctrine divides insurgency also into three phases: subversion, guerrilla warfare and war of movement.

Phase I — (Subversion/Strategic Defensive) — The beginnings of an insurgency are difficult to recognize. They may appear as one of the many legitimate movements for social, political or religious reforms. A leadership appears which is capable of crystallizing discontent into an impulse for action. An organization that is capable of planning, coordinating and executing actions is established. Resources are obtained; bases are established; agitation-propaganda against the government is made; people are organized; acts of violence are conducted to induce the government to respond which, in turn, will alienate the people; martyrs are made; riots are instigated; and terrorism is started.

Phase II — (Organized Guerrilla Warfare/Strategic Stalemate) —This phase occurs when the insurgent movement, having developed a strong organization and generated local and external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare and related forms of violence against the government. They concentrate their efforts to gain startling local successes at time and place of their own choosing. They seek to exploit every government weaknesses and to undermine and/or circumvent every government strength. They attempt to frustrate the government's development efforts and try to break down law and order. The military element of the insurgents in addition to their tactical role, is used in the accelerated expansion of the underground organization which in turn accelerates the building of insurgent militia forces. More guerrilla bases, training centers, and sanctuaries are established and more violent acts against the government are conducted.

Phase III — (War of Movement/Strategic Offensive) —By this time, regular-type military forces have been organized on a regional and sometimes nationwide basis. The insurgents may eventually engage security forces in a decisive campaign or insurgents may establish complete control in some portions of the country and seek international recognition and the status of

belligerency for their government. At the same time, the insurgents continue to expand and perfect their military and political organizations.

The CPP/NPA in the late 1960's and early 1970's, envisioned four stages, "the quarter storms", to overthrow the government. Figure 2 shows the characteristics, targets and strategic objectives of each quarter storm.[42]

Figure 2. Features of Quarter Storms

Quarter	Characteristics	Target(s)	Strategic Objective(s)
First Quarter Subversion	* Infiltration of various sectors/ bases of the nation * Agitation * Propaganda * Party building	* Political * Economic * Pscyhological * Ideological * Military	* Develop awareness * Develop revolutionary will * Detach people from incumbent gov't/ regime
Second Quarter	* Military small unit action * Terrorism * Establishment of resistance infrastructures	* Military primarily * Same as in first quarter	* Pose a military challenge to regime * Seize politico-military initiative through intensified or expanded guerrilla operations * Enhance detachment of people from incumbent government/regime
Fourth quarter Civil War	* Warfare between contesting governments and armed forces * International solidarity works	* Military * Political	* Bring about collapse government/regime * Destruction of its armed forces * Replacement of government and armed forces by those of the insurgent organization

The insurgency may not pass through each of the stages described above. Furthermore, different phases may occur simultaneously in different parts of the country. Moreover, several insurgencies may exist simultaneously within country.

When the insurgents lack the means to force a final decision and the government is equally incapable to defeat the insurgents, the movement may go on for years.

Insurgent Capabilities[4][3]

Insurgent capabilities can be classified into three broad areas: basic, supporting and reinforcing. Activities aimed directly and immediately toward the overthrow of the government are called *basic capabilities*. *Supporting activities*, on the other hand, are those which pertain directly to the maintenance of insurgent's activities and only indirectly to the downfall of the government. The insurgent's ability to concentrate or reinforce his effort in one area of activity is called a *reinforcing capability*.

Basic Capabilities

1. *Non-violent actions* — Non-violent actions are directed toward bringing about changes in the political, economic and social frameworks of the society frequently through psychological means. In this manner, the insurgents create in the minds of friendly, hostile, and neutral individuals opinions, attitudes, feelings, drives, and behaviors which are favorable to his objectives. In the early stage of the insurgency, mental and emotional persuasion is the primary weapon of the insurgent.

(a) *Political.* The insurgent attempts to influence the direction, control, and authority exercised over the nation as a whole and the political administration. The insurgents themselves may run for elective positions.

(b) *Economic.* Insurgents attempt to affect the production, distribution and consumption of resources which may impair the effectiveness of the government. The insurgent may interfere in the form of boycotts, strikes, riots, or even civic actions to improve a local economy. The local tax structure, monetary policies, and others may be subverted in order to provide a means of revenue to them and at the same time, picture the government as inefficient and corrupt. Counterfeiting may even occur.

(c) *Sociological.* The insurgents initially attempt to exploit those traditional social and behavioral patterns of the people which further their interests. Existing social organizations are identified and new ones are created in the minds of the people. Unrest is promoted through agitation and propaganda.

2. *Terroristic activities.* Terroristic activities are useful to intimidate the people. It may be applied selectively or indiscriminately. Terrorism magnifies the power of the insurgent and undermines the confidence in the government.

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3. *Guerrilla Operations.* Guerrilla operations by the insurgents indicate advanced stages of the insurgency. The insurgent force makes up for the weaknesses of the processes of the revolution. Usual guerrilla operations are harassment, destruction, and interdiction.

4. *Conventional Tactical Operations.* Conventional tactical operations can be considered from the viewpoint of the insurgent's ability to attack, defend, or withdraw when opposed by government troops.

Supporting Capabilities

1. *Intelligence and Security.* Intelligence and security are vital to the survival of the insurgents.

2. *Recruitment and Retention.* Aggressive recruitment is essential to the attainment of the expanded objectives.

3. *Organization and Training.* As the membership of the organization grows, the need for training of new members increases.

4. *Finance and Logistics.* The basic resources must be obtained to pursue the revolution. This depends upon the ability of the insurgents to effectively use the many collection techniques at their disposal.

Reinforcement Capability

This capability is based on the availability of resources and on the mission. Because of limited resources, reinforcement in one area may weaken the other areas.

Potential Insurgent Vulnerabilities[44]

Vital to the success of counter insurgency operations is the exploitation of identified insurgent weaknesses. The insurgent may be aware of his weaknesses and will do what he can to correct or conceal them.

Exploitative Weaknesses

1. *Insurgent Intelligence Needs.* This need is very critical in the early phase of the insurgency. The intelligence system is dependent on human resources.

2. *Insurgent Organization Structure.* Command and control over the insurgent military structure usually is exercised by the political organization at each level. This tends to negate the insurgents' practice of compartmentalization for security purposes. Penetration of one of their cells may lead to the penetration of parallel cells.

3. *Communications Requirements.* As the insurgency progresses, rapid and large communication system may be needed to exercise command and control. The insurgents may be forced to use established systems such as telephones, telegraphs, radio and the postal service. When they do this, their

communication system becomes very vulnerable to interception and penetration by the government.

4. *Logistical Requirements.* A large portion of the insurgents' logistical needs are obtained from the immediate areas of operation. Procurement of supplies, equipment, and services is by local purchase, voluntary contributions, theft, levies on the populace, raids, and combat operations. As the insurgency expands, there is an increase of demand from the public and this may alienate the insurgents from the people.

5. *Tactical Operations.* The insurgents are not as trained as the government troops. Their concentration may be detected, their bases located and their sanctuaries interdicted.

6. *Political Isolation.* The insurgents prevent their isolation. They provide diversions and provocations when needed, to maintain contact, to keep the world aware of an insurgency in progress even if there is no progress to report.

Insurgent Organization

Any insurgent movement has a relatively visible armed force and a clandestine support organization. Studies indicate that there is an average of nine persons in support of each armed insurgent and perhaps six percent of the population is engaged in underground activities in one form or another to support the insurgents.[4][5]

In a communist insurgency, the organization is primarily political and secondarily military. The Vietnam People's Army, for example, is "built in accordance with the political line of the Party. . . It has always been and will always be under the leadership of the Party."[4][6] This is a confirmation of Mao Tse Tung's statement that "power grows out of the barrel of the gun," hence the party not the state must control the gun.

In communist insurgencies, the party is organized parallel to the existing government organization. At the base of the structure are the "cells" which normally function as a unit. In most instances, this structure consists of committee organization at the barangay, municipal, district, provincial, regional and national levels. Intermediate echelons may be deleted from the party structure if the party leadership believes it can adequately supervise and coordinate the activities from a national level.

The Party organization especially at the early stage of the insurgency is austere and simple. It consists of a little more than a committee system plus such agencies or specialized personnel as might be required. As the insurgency grows, mass civil organizations are organized.

A typical communist organization has three elements: party core, mass civil organization and a military force. The mass civil organization—popular

organization, special interest groups and the barangay militia—serves the party leadership in several ways: (1) they provide a seemingly legitimate front which by outside appearance represents the interest of the people; (2) they provide a cover which diverts the attention away from the Party and its operations; (3) they provide a means of diverting and mobilizing the allegiance of the population away from the government which constitutes a means of social control; and (4) they provide the apparatus for establishing a "shadow government" or an actual government replacing the so-called legal government.

A front is established to gain access and control over unorganized sectors of the population. In creating such an organizational weapon, the party seeks to create a useful "mass" by transforming an unstructured segment of the population such as the youth, the unemployed, and the intelligensia, into one group which has a leadership and channels of communication and mobilization of its own. A united front is also organized to align all popular organizations against the government in the furtherance of mutual objectives.

As the insurgency gains momentum, the united front metamorphoses into federated fronts commonly referred to as "National Liberation Fronts." These appear when the Party has achieved some degree of military predominance and has controlled a majority of the population in a given area.

Within these fronts are Liberation Committees composed mainly of non-communist members who pre-empt local government administration at barangay, municipal, provincial, regional levels replacing *de jure* administration with *de facto* control by the insurgent.

According to communist doctrine, the military is one of the several instruments through which the Party seeks to gain power. A communist military force usually consists of the Main Force, Regional Force and the paramilitary barangay militia. The highly trained and better equipped Main Force is the elite fighting force. The Regional Forces are made up of indigenous volunteers/recruits from mass civil organizations or of those promoted from the barangay militia. The barangay militia is an elite formation within the civil structure. They are part-time military force organized and trained for the defense of the barangay, support of the regular insurgent forces, and enforcement of the will of the Party.

Summary

Successful insurgent movements are normally based on societal problems that acquire political significance. A vulnerable society gives rise to popular discontent which the insurgents use to raise the level of revolution-

ary anticipation of a crisis point at which the insurgency becomes country-wide and the masses carry out the final task of destroying the existing order.

The speed with which the movement attains this objective is dependent upon the effectiveness of the insurgent leadership, ideology and cadre in harnessing popular and external support, in organizing and developing sanctuaries and in collecting accurate and timely intelligence.

Insurgency is a war for the future, directed towards the transformation of the old order, towards the destruction of existing institutions and the creation of new systems within the framework of the new ideology accepted by the once immobile exploited and/or repressed masses.

The insurgent's strategy from the very start is dictated by his resources. To be successful and to avoid extermination, he will wage a protracted war. His mere survival is a political victory.

The insurgents need time to develop the revolutionary will and allow the inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the incumbent to develop further under the stress of the conflict. As previously mentioned, insurgency is like the "war of the flea." The flea bites, hops, and bites again, nimbly avoiding the foot that will crush him. He does not seek to destroy the enemy with one blow but to bleed him, to bedevil him, to feed on him, to keep him from resting and to destroy his nerve and his morale. All these require time. Still more time is needed to breed more fleas.

Unless the dynamics of insurgency is understood, then the defeat of the government shall be an accomplished fact long before the decisive battle shall have been fought.

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